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CORRESPONDENCE Open Access
Setting standards for empirical bioethics
research: a response to Carter and Cribb
Michael Dunn1,2* , Jonathan Ives3, Bert Molewijk4 and Jan Schildmann5
Abstract
This paper responds to the commentaries from Stacy Carter and Alan Cribb. We pick up on two main themes in
our response. First, we reflect on how the process of setting standards for empirical bioethics research entails
drawing boundaries around what research counts as empirical bioethics research, and we discuss whether the
standards agreed in the consensus process draw these boundaries correctly. Second, we expand on the discussion
in the original paper of the role and significance of the concept of ‘integrating’ empirical methods and ethical
argument as a standard for research practice within empirical bioethics.
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We would like to begin by offering our thanks to Stacy
Carter and Alan Cribb for their commentaries [1, 2] on
the report of the process of building consensus around
standards for research practice in empirical bioethics [3].
It is to their utmost credit that we found ourselves reading
both sets of remarks with wry smiles on our faces. The
accuracy of Carter’s and Cribb’s imagined account of how
disagreement manifested itself in the consensus-building
exercise was uncanny. This, we think, reflects both their
understanding of the subtle but significant tensions that
lie just below the surface of empirical bioethical inquiry,
and their careful reading of our methodological represen-
tation of the consensus-building process.
The contours of agreement and disagreement
We should also begin by adding that we wholeheartedly
agree with the general thrust of both commentaries. We
take seriously the call for this consensus-building exercise
to act as a springboard to encourage continued thinking
and dialogue about the enterprise of empirical bioethics.
Nothing in the paper contradicts this. We also recognise
that seeking to set standards risks being read as an
attempt to foreclose further debate, or as the settling of
important matters relating to the conduct of empirical
bioethics research. We certainly do not think that matters
are settled, nor did we set out with such a lofty goal in
mind. Carter raises a worry that the development of
standards for empirical bioethics will determine (or be
read as determining) “how we should do empirical
bioethics” [1]. To clarify: in no way should the paper be
read as an attempt to determine the precise shape of
research work that should be undertaken by empirical
bioethicists. In setting out on this project, we were
driven by a desire to provide more clarity about what
elements of good research practice ought to undergird
empirical bioethics research in order to improve quality
standards and transparency within the field. Whilst we
think we have achieved this more modest achievement, it
is important to recognise that one of the main strengths
of the standards that were agreed within our consensus
process lies in the fact that they allow for a potentially
unlimited range of methodological approaches and the-
oretical positions to be endorsed and defended. Indeed,
upon reflecting on our own involvement in the process,
we acknowledge that an important secondary outcome of
the exercise was a new-found ability to better identify and
locate the contours of disagreement that lie at the heart of
the developing field of empirical bioethics.
In light of these initial remarks, our intention in this
response is not to rebut, defend, or counter-argue against
the points raised by either commentator. As Carter and
Cribb have highlighted a number of concerns that we
ourselves share, we will draw upon their remarks in a
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way that we hope will stimulate further conversation.
We strongly believe that conversation of this kind must
not end if empirical bioethics is going to continue to
evolve in a carefully considered and coherent manner.
Disagreements will no doubt continue, regardless of
these standards, and further work is necessary to give
further practical shape to the application of standards of
these kinds in research activities [4]. Notwithstanding the
reality of continued disagreement, we also want to pause
and reflect on a core characteristic of the process. Namely,
that we managed to bring together 16 diverse academics
from across Europe, that this group was able to enter (and
exit) the process holding diverse methodological commit-
ments and radically different views about the nature of
ethics and ethical properties, and that the group was still
able to come to consensus on all the standards outlined in
the original paper. Agreement was far more prevalent than
disagreement, and this is no small achievement.
The commentators’ remarks cover wide-ranging terri-
tory, and we limit our response to two overarching themes
that emerge from both commentaries. These are: i) the
relationship between setting standards and drawing
boundaries, and ii) the place of the concept of ‘integra-
tion’ as a core domain for standard-setting in empirical
bioethics.
Setting standards and drawing boundaries
As Cribb recognises, setting standards necessarily involves
the drawing boundaries around research activities, and that
“a necessary part of setting standards for ‘x’ is specifying
what is meant by ‘x’” [2]. This is significant because
specifying what is meant by empirical bioethics will
have potentially problematic implications for a diverse
body of researchers who self-identify as empirical bioethi-
cists in an emerging field that strives to be as inclusive as
possible. We think that these implications are inevitable.
The upshot of this, as Cribb and Carter both recognise
(and that participants in the consensus exercise them-
selves recognised), is that certain research activities that
involve conducting empirical research within bioethics
will not count as empirical bioethics research in the
way the group determined that such research should be
characterised.
What precisely is the worry here? The field of empirical
bioethics, broadly construed, incorporates distinctive
research activities that would be excluded from the
standardised account of the aims and objectives of empirical
bioethics research endorsed in the consensus process. We
outlined four such activities in the original paper, but one
can delineate the empirical from the ethical in ways that give
shape to an even broader range of research activities
e.g. [5, 6]. When we embarked on this project, we
naively thought that we could make progress in obtaining
agreement about methodological, rather than broader
research, standards in empirical bioethics. Underlying this
presumption was the idea that empirical bioethicists have
a relatively clear sense of what they aim to achieve when
embarking on an empirical bioethics research project, and
why they aim to achieve this. Thus, what we felt was
needed was a way to formally communicate and codify
these aspects of our work between ourselves such that
they could be recognised as having been conducted
competently. As we set in place the process and recruited
participants, this presumption quickly melted away. It
became clear to all of us, and this was endorsed in Rounds
1–4 of consensus building, that the domains around
which standards were needed included broader aspects of
decision-making in research – most notably around the
articulation of aims and objectives of empirical bioethics
research itself.
The three standards that were agreed in the two domains
of ‘Aims’ and ‘Objectives’ were debated extensively during
all rounds of consensus building, and these domains do
indeed function to set clear and agreed boundaries about
what counts as empirical bioethics research. Notably,
research of this kind should “address a normative issue
that is oriented towards practice” (Standard 1), and it
should “integrate empirical methods with ethical argument
in order to address this normative issue” (Standard 2).
Carter draws attention to one form of research activity
that we claimed would be excluded: “empirical research
that reveals the form and nature of how ethical issues
arise in practical situations” [1]. She also draws our atten-
tion to two other forms of research activity: developing
“new insights that could broaden one’s moral horizon”
and explanations of “relevant aspects of the problem” [1]
that we claimed would be included. One concern with
drawing boundaries in this way is that excluding the first
research activity “slices off much useful work from
Australia, the UK and elsewhere that explains the moral
reasoning and practices of lay people and professionals”
[2]. The implicit point being made here is that this work
would be rendered less useful if it was excluded, or sliced
off, in such a manner. There is no good reason, however,
to think that merely falling outside the boundaries of
standards for empirical bioethics research, as defined in
the original paper, renders that work any less valuable,
or of lesser quality, than work that falls within such
boundaries. There could of course be very important
reasons for undertaking such research, even if it is not
research that would meet the requirements to be described
as empirical bioethics. Standards 1, 2 and 3 are definitional
in character. Failing to meet these three standards, there-
fore, implies nothing about the fundamental quality of the
research activity being undertaken, just whether or not it is
activity of the relevant kind.
Precisely whether particular empirical research activities
fall within or outside these standards for empirical bioethics
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on the basis of the first three standards would benefit from
additional clarification on our part. Drawing the correct
boundaries here will depend fundamentally on what these
research activities set out to achieve. The reason we
excluded the first type of research activity mentioned
by Carter was because we imagined that revealing the
form and nature of how ethical issues arise in practical
situations functioned as an end in itself. On this account,
the aim would not be to judge how those issues ought to
be addressed, or how people ought to behave, but to
expose and explore the moral complexities that arise for
people in the world, in their own terms. As the description
and explanation of patterns of moral behaviour, attitudes,
or experiences are the goals of inquiry, then this activity
does not aim to address a normative issue, and would fail
to meet Standard 1. This would be the case even if, as a
consequence of this activity, participants in the research
changed their behaviour or practice as a result of their
contributions to determining the content of the ethical
issues they faced. We might better characterise research of
this kind as ‘descriptive ethics’, even if it has non-intended
normative consequences.
In contrast, activities that involve ‘expanding one’s moral
horizon’ appear, at least at first glance, to be normative
activities, when this phrase is taken to capture research
that determines how identified ethical considerations
should be taken into account. Equally, there might well be
ways of describing a study where the phrase “expand one’s
moral horizon” is drawn upon such that the empirical
research conducted is not focused on addressing a norma-
tive issue. The key question, according to the requirement
of Standard 1 and regardless of how the research activity is
named, is: does the empirical research – taking place in a
single study or as a component of a broader programme of
research activities – aim to address a normative issue?
We recognise that this response might not satisfy all
of our readers. Some disagreement will revolve around
the phrases we have used to describe certain research
activities, which imply descriptive or normative orientations
that are not as clear as they perhaps could be. It is likely
that any residual disagreement is likely to concern how
the distinction between empirical and normative research
aims trades off background disagreements within the
social sciences about the normative content of empirical
research. This is particularly an issue in those empirical
(especially qualitative) traditions that are derived from
social theoretical positions that are founded on strong
normative presuppositions [7]. In such empirical research,
the empirical activity itself is likely to look very similar
to empirical bioethics research, and will involve making
(implicitly or explicitly) normative claims as part of the
discussion of the empirical findings. Thus, in Marxist or
feminist traditions in the social sciences, for example, it is
very likely that qualitative empirical research methodologies
that are derived from the main tenets of the theories within
these traditions will qualify as empirical bioethics research
under Standard 1. There will be additional questions about
whether such research meets Standard 2, or those standards
specified within Domain 5, and this will depend on whether
ethical argument is integrated with empirical methods
in the research activity, or if it is an additional project
component in a wider programme of bioethics research.
Quite what is required by reference to integration here is
where we now turn.
The requirement to integrate empirical research
with ethical argument
Both Carter and Cribb discuss the central place given to the
requirement to ‘integrate’ empirical research and ethical
argument in the agreed standards. A number of concerns
are expressed, with Carter drawing attention to more
conceptual objections, and Cribb outlining some more
practical worries. One of Carter’s concerns is that the
concept of integration, as articulated through the relevant
standards, assumes the separability of the descriptive and
the normative. A second concern is that the process of
determining the rightful place of integration in standard-set-
ting was circular in character. This, she claims, is because
participants were asked to accept this concept when signing
up for their involvement in consensus-building, thus
assuming and ‘writing-in’ separability throughout the
entire process.
On the second charge first. It is certainly true that we
have drawn extensively on the concept of integration as a
defining feature of the attempt to differentiate empirical
bioethics research from other ways of making use of
empirical research in bioethics (Ives et al., book, intro).
This goes some way to explain why we included refer-
ence to integration in describing ‘a minimal account of
empirical bioethics’ at the start of the process. Rounds
1 and 2, however, involved considerable debate about
the domains within which standards needed to be
agreed. As we discussed above, it was within this phase
of the process that we abandoned the minimal account
of empirical bioethics that had been circulated prior to
the meeting, and recognised that separate ‘definitional’
domains of Aims and Objectives needed to be considered
in the standard-setting process. This led to the concept of
integration being extensively debated, and a recognition
that specific standards associated with the requirement
to integrate empirical research with ethical argument
were necessary. Thus, participants spent considerable
time debating the appropriateness, and rightful place,
of the concept of integration in empirical bioethics.
Parallel discussions led to a number of other domains,
standards, and concepts being abandoned or reworked.
The concept of integration survived this process. Here,
we rely on the robustness of the consensus-building
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process we adopted, and believe that the activities that
constituted this process provide a compelling response
to any concerns about circularity.
But what of the problematic broader assumptions that
underlie the concept of integration as endorsed in the
project? One unfortunate connotation of this word is that
it is often taken to refer to a procedural or methodological
requirement to connect different (disciplinary) research
activities. The consensus process did not signify the
endorsement of this interpretation. We recognise that this
term will be uncomfortable, awkward, or misplaced for
some empirical bioethicists, but, in the process, this term
was preferred to alternatives like ‘connection’, ‘relation’ or
‘co-existence’ (a term which Cribb favours in his commen-
tary), which were considered and ultimately rejected. The
consensus view was taken that those empirical bioethics
researchers who believe that the empirical and the nor-
mative are inseparable will need to carefully describe
why integration is not directly relevant to them, and
precisely how the empirical and normative relate in their
work in ways that avoid a specific need to integrate different
research activities within their methodological design.
Once this has been done, these researchers will also
need to carefully consider how they meet standards within
Domains 4 and 5 (‘Conduct of empirical work’ and
‘Conduct of normative work’), in light of their view
about the precise relationship between the empirical
and the normative within Domain 3. Denial of the
fact-value distinction is likely to favour more entangled
methodologies, and its acceptance is likely to favour
distinctive empirical and ethical phases in an empirical
bioethics project, but this need not be the case. It is entirely
coherent to hold the view that facts and values are insepar-
able, but still to endorse a separation of empirical and
normative analytic phases within the design of an empirical
bioethics research project. Equally, it also coherent to
endorse the fact-value distinction but also to favour an
approach to empirical bioethics research that interweaves
empirical and normative analysis in complex methodo-
logical designs.
Cribb claims that one upshot of these standards is that
“different strands of research within a large research
programme, and sometimes within a single project, will
fall either side of this boundary [of what counts as empir-
ical bioethics]” [3]. Cribb is right to draw attention to the
practical difficulty that will arise in how the standards are
applied in project management terms. An important way
in which the concept of integration is formulated means
that it could apply at different scales of research activity:
from sub-project to overarching programme. This is an
issue for empirical bioethics research in just the same way
as it is for bioethics research more generally – where a
justified answer to a primary, normative bioethics research
question is likely to allow for a number of detailed research
objectives, and a wide range of multi-disciplinary meth-
odological strategies, within an overarching bioethics
research project, that intersect in complex ways [8].
Thus, integration could happen across an entire research
programme, when empirical and ethical analytic method-
ologies are adopted in phased research project activities,
or a single empirical ethics project might involve a
discrete piece of research where empirical analysis and
ethical argument are fully intertwined. Which approach is
to be preferred will, in large part, depend on articulating a
research design that adheres to the kinds of standards put
forward in the original paper. We hope that readers will
approach these standards in the constructive way that they
are intended to be engaged with. Strong disagreement
with what was agreed in the consensus-building process
could be just as productive for the further evolution of
empirical bioethics research as widespread agreement will
be, and so should not be shunned. We look forward to
more exchanges on how to further develop and refine
these standards as debates on the nature and quality of
empirical bioethics continue into the future.
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